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ABSTRACT
Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014, severe
limitations have been placed on Ukraine’s coastal state rights and
navigational freedoms in the Black and Azov Seas and the Kerch
Strait. The “Kerch Strait clash” in November 2018, which resulted
in the Russian capture of three Ukrainian naval vessels in
international waters south of the strait, can be seen as the
temporary culmination of tensions that have been building up
over a longer period. In violation of international law and bilateral
agreements, Russia has in recent years pursued an increasingly
assertive and revisionist policy in the region and sought to turn
the maritime spaces on the country’s southwestern flank into a
“Russian lake”. This policy is affecting not only the security and
economy of neighbouring states such as Ukraine and Georgia,
but also the strategic balance in the southeastern corner of
Europe. Drawing on empirical evidence derived from Russian,
Ukrainian and Western sources, as well as insights from
neoclassical realist theory, this article discusses legal, economic
and security aspects of Russia’s ongoing quest for a dominant
position in the Black Sea region.
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In the evening of 25 November 2018, three Ukrainian Navy vessels were fired upon,
damaged and captured by Russian Coast Guard vessels, supported by Russian fighter
jets and attack helicopters, in international waters south of the Kerch Strait entrance.
Earlier the same day, the Ukrainian vessels had been trying to enter the strait in order
to complete a planned transit from the Black Sea port of Odesa to the Azov Sea port of
Berdyansk. The captured vessels and their 24 crewmembers, some of whomwere severely
injured, remained in Russian captivity until the autumn of the following year. The crew-
members returned to Ukraine in connection with a prisoner exchange on 7 September
2019 and the vessels were returned on 18 November 2019, almost a year after the
incident.
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Ukrainian authorities, as well as a number of Western nations, including the U.S.,
reacted strongly to Russia’s behaviour and excessive use of force during the Kerch
Strait incident. The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a harsh statement, describ-
ing the capture of the Ukrainian vessels as “another act of aggression of the Russian Fed-
eration against Ukraine” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine 2018a). Similarly, U.S.
Ambassador to the United Nations, Nikki Haley, called it “another reckless Russian escala-
tion” of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and an “outrageous violation of Ukraine’s sovereign
territory”. She called on Russia to “immediately cease its unlawful conduct and respect the
navigational rights and freedoms of all states” (NPR 2018).
The maritime areas south of Ukraine – the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov – have in many
ways become a “third front” in the seven-year conflict between Russia and Ukraine, in
addition to Crimea and the Donbas. By expanding its military aggression against Ukraine
to the sea, Russia has entered a new phase in its confrontation with Kyiv and added new
dimensions to the problem of how to restore political and military stability in the region.
The Russo-Ukrainian conflict, or rather cluster of conflicts, has already had dire conse-
quences for the security situation in Southeast Europe, Russia’s relations with the North-
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and Russia’s international standing. In addition, and
equally worrisome, Ukraine has de facto lost control of much of its economic zone and
continental shelf in the northern part of the Black Sea, much like Georgia did in the
waters off Abkhazia after the Russo-Georgian war in 2008.
Within the Western research community, much attention has been devoted to the
dynamics on the first two “fronts”, that is, in Crimea (Becker et al. 2016, Allison 2017,
Rotaru 2020) and the Donbas (Bowen 2017, Hosaka 2019, Malyarenko and Wolff 2019).
Less attention has been devoted to the third and more recent “front”, that is, what is hap-
pening in the maritime areas on Ukraine’s southern flank.1 The purpose of this article is to
address this shortcoming by providing a critical analysis of the dynamics on the “third
front” of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict.
Two questions are of special interest in this regard: First, how does Russia pursue its
strategic interests in the maritime areas south and east of Crimea? And second, what
are the sources of Russia’s conduct in the region? A deeper understanding of the how
and why of Russia’s actions in the Sea of Azov, the Kerch Strait and the Black Sea can
make Ukraine’s Western partners better equipped to deal with, and counteract, Russia’s
ongoing advances in its “southwest strategic direction”.2 Russia’s legal revisionism and
military posturing in the greater Black Sea region affect not only the security of
Ukraine, but also that of that of Europe as a whole.
The three “fronts” of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict are interrelated in a number of ways.
Hence, Russia’s objectives and behaviour within the maritime domain need to be ana-
lysed in the context of the situation on land and the fact that approximately seven
percent of Ukraine’s land territory (United Nations 2019) is currently controlled by
Russia (Crimea) or by proxies controlled and armed by Russia (the Donbas). Russia’s “jur-
isdictional creep” into the maritime domain south and east of Crimea represents a severe
and growing challenge for Ukraine and its Western partners. At the opening ceremony for
the 18th edition of the multinational “Sea Breeze” naval exercise, held in the Black Sea
port of Odesa in July 2018, Ukraine’s Navy Chief, Vice Admiral Ihor Voronchenko, gave
the following assessment of the security situation in the Azov–Black Sea basin:
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A very tense situation has developed in the Azov and Black Seas as the Russian Federation is
carrying out activities that discredit all norms and principles of international maritime law.
Further “creeping” annexation of our exclusive maritime economic zone is taking place
[…] There is no need to be guided by the principles of Tsar Peter the Great or Empress Cathe-
rine. We must understand that it is not the eighteenth century now but the twenty first, and
the whole world lives by other norms. The Azov and Black Seas are not internal lakes of the
Russian Federation, and they shouldn’t be dictating us any of their positions and framework
conditions. (UNIAN 2018)
The conflict between Russia and Ukraine plays out, and will likely continue to play out, in
different geographical arenas, on land and at sea. The nature of the conflict is, and will
continue to be, complex and multidimensional. Three dimensions stand out as particu-
larly relevant: the legal dimension, the economic dimension and the security dimension.
Russia’s conduct in the region is driven by economic and security interests and under-
pinned by legal (or quasi-legal) arguments. For instance, Russia’s building of a 19-kilo-
metre road and railway bridge across the Kerch Strait in 2016–2020 triggered a host of
controversies between the two countries, pertaining to the project’s legal, economic
and security aspects and implications. These came on top of already existing controver-
sies related to Russia’s territorial advances in Crimea and the Donbas.
The article will proceed as follows: The next section embeds the study in classical and
neoclassical realist theory, introduces the concept of “revisionist states” and argues that
Russia’s actions in the Black Sea region are driven by state objectives that are distinctly
revisionist. Section three offers a legal perspective on Russia’s post-2014 policies in the
Black Sea, the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait. Section four discusses the economic
aspects of Russia’s pursuit of a dominant position in said maritime areas. Section five
zeroes in on the security dimension of Russia’s maritime expansionism in the Black Sea
region. The sixth and final section of the article features a brief summary of findings
and some concluding remarks.
Power and change in the Black Sea region: a neoclassical realist
perspective
Students and scholars of international relations, as well as practitioners of foreign and
security policy, have at different junctures in history concerned themselves with the
phenomenon of “revisionist states”. Simply put, a revisionist state is a state whose behav-
iour is driven by a desire to change the (global or regional) system that it is part of and/or
improve its own position within the system. Revisionist states are often contrasted with
“status-quo states”, that is, states that strive to preserve things as they are, including
the system that they are part of and their place within it. That is also how they seek to
preserve their security. As noted by Barry Buzan (2016 [1991], p. 241), “[i]f stability is
the security goal of the status quo, then change is the banner of revisionism”.
Other prominent international relations theorists have used different, but closely
related, concepts to describe the phenomenon. E. H. Carr (1946) distinguishes between
“satisfied” and “dissatisfied” powers, Frederick Schuman (1948) distinguishes between
“satiated” and “unsatiated” powers, Hans Morgenthau (1948) distinguishes between
“imperialistic” and “status quo” powers, and Henry Kissinger (1957) distinguishes
between “revolutionary” and “status-quo” states. What these and other analyses seem
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to have in common, however, is the view that states differ not only in power, but also in
the type of goals that they pursue in the international arena.
The differentiation between, on the one hand, “revisionist”/“imperialistic”/“dissa-
tisfied”/“unsatiated” states and, on the other hand, “status-quo seeking”/“satisfied”/
“satiated” states has been a recurring topic in classical and neoclassical realist writings.
Neorealists, for their part, have been less interested in the topic. Their traditional focus
has been the dynamics at the “system” level and how states balance against power to
ensure their security. Neorealism is not, and does not purport to be, a theory of foreign
policy-making. Rather, it is a theory of international politics. As argued by Kenneth
Waltz (1979, p. 121), structural theories of international politics cannot explain the particu-
lar policies of states any more than Newton’s law of universal gravitation can predict the
“wayward path of a falling leaf”.
Unlike neorealists, neoclassical realists – a term originally coined by Gideon Rose (1998)
– seek to move away from system-level determinism and incorporate unit-level variables,
such as state objectives, into the analysis. At the same time, they acknowledge that a
country’s foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the international
system and by the relative distribution of capabilities, largely consistent with Thucydides’
famous saying that “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must”
(Strassler 1996, p. 352, cited in Rose 1998, p. 147).
Regardless of whether they belong to the classical, neoclassical or neorealist camp, rea-
lists do share a number of basic assumptions: First, they all adhere to the assumption that
states are the most important actors on the world scene. Second, they consider that
anarchy is a central feature of the international system.3 Third, they take for granted
that states seek to maximise their security or their power.4 Fourth, they assume that
state behaviour, for the most part, is shaped by the nature of the international system.
Fifth, they assume that states adopt instrumentally rational policies in their pursuit of
power or security. Sixth, they assume that states rely on military force to enhance their
security and shape or gain control over their environment (Frankel 1996, pp. xiv–xviii,
Rose 1998, p. 152, Ripsman et al. 2016, pp. 179–180).
The sixth assumption – that force has not lost its utility as an instrument of foreign
policy – implies that “the relative power position of a state matters” (Frankel 1996,
p. xviii), at the global as well as at the regional level. Furthermore, as noted by Buzan
(2016 [1991], p. 241), “[i]t clearly makes a big difference to the system whether the revi-
sionist states are strong or weak powers”. A country like Albania may be highly revisionist,
but it does not really matter as long as the country does not have the power to challenge
the status quo in its neighbourhood. Conversely, in the Black Sea region, Russia is at the
top of the power hierarchy and clearly capable of challenging the status quo and reshap-
ing the regional order in a manner that fits its interests.
In the classical and neoclassical realist literature, the definitions of revisionism and
status-quo seeking can be divided into two main categories (Davidson 2006, p. 12).
One strain of research (Morgenthau 1948, p. 51, Kydd 1997, p. 115, Schweller 1998,
p. 15) draws the line based on whether the state in question seeks power or security.
Simply put, states that seek to maximise their power are revisionist (or “imperialist” in
Morgenthau’s terminology), and states that seek to maximise their security are status
quo-oriented. As noted by Davidson (2006, p. 13), there are several problems with this
308 K. ÅTLAND
definition, not least that it is difficult to justify the claim that security-seeking can be aban-
doned for the sake of power-seeking, or vice versa.
Another strain of research builds on Arnold Wolfers’ (1962, pp. 90–92) assertion that
revisionist states have policy objectives expressing a demand for “values not already
enjoyed”, whereas status quo states seek the “maintenance, protection, or defense
of the existing distribution of values”, that is, the preservation of what they already
have. “Values”, also referred to as “goods”, are in Wolfers’ book understood as
valued or desired things, such as territory, markets, (expansion of) ideology and the
creation of change of international law and institutions. Davidson’s (2006, p. 14)
definition, which is largely based on Wolfers’, states that revisionist states are “states
that seek to change the distribution” of goods such as those mentioned above,
whereas status-quo seeking states are “states that seek to maintain the distribution”
of them. Of the five “goods” listed in Wolfers’ and Davidson’s definition, number
one, two, four and five are of special interest to the case of this study. The “ideological
change” dimension is more relevant to other historical cases, as Davidson also demon-
strates in his book.
Turning to the region of this study and the question of how and why Russia seeks to
dominate it at the expense of its southwestern neighbours, it may be helpful to reflect a
little on what kind of region we are dealing with, and how it is to be delineated. As
observed by Oleksandr Pavliuk (2015, p. 7), the Black Sea region is “one of the most het-
erogeneous and complex areas in wider Europe”. Since ancient times, it has been a cross-
roads for different ethnic groups, civilisations, empires and nation states. The Black Sea
has served as a natural barrier or buffer zone, hampering the region’s civilizational devel-
opment along the North–South axis. At other times, cooperative cross-sea relationships
have been formed, North–South as well as East–West, to the benefit of regional stability
and the economic well-being the coastal states.
The Black Sea is currently surrounded by six coastal states – Bulgaria, Romania,
Ukraine, Russia, Georgia and Turkey (see Figure 1). Three of them – Bulgaria, Romania
and Turkey – are members of NATO, whereas Ukraine and Georgia have voiced aspira-
tions to become NATO members. In addition to the six Black Sea coastal states, six more
states are included in the 12-member Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)5 –
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Greece, Moldova and Serbia. These countries seem to
have less of a Black Sea identity than the six coastal states. Partly because of this, the
BSEC and other regional cooperation arrangements established in the 1990s and
2000s have only been moderately successful, and Russia’s 2014 interventions in
Crimea and the Donbas seem to have further complicated interstate relationships in
the region, particularly between Russia and Ukraine.
In previous studies dealing with the Russian annexation of Crimea, it has been dis-
cussed whether it “can be explained by reference to Russia’s greatly enhanced sense of
regional entitlement and a revisionist view of international legal order” (Allison 2017,
p. 521), and whether “Russia’s underlying motivations can be understood through neo-
classical realist assumptions of foreign policy-making and grand strategy formation”
(Becker et al. 2016, p. 113). Both of these interpretations make sense, and I will argue
that they apply not only to the Crimean peninsula, but also to the adjacent maritime
areas, referred to above as the “third front” of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict.
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The legal dimension
Russia’s post-2014 quest for regional dominance in and around the Black Sea basin has
been – and remains – a multidimensional endeavour. Backed by military and economic
power, efforts have been made to replace the previously functioning legal order of the
region with a new order, defined and enforced by Russia. Russia does not share what
seems to be the prevailing view among Western scholars and political leaders, namely
that the country’s 2014 annexation of Crimea was “unlawful and therefore invalid”
(Bothe 2014, p. 99). Exercising de facto authority over the peninsula, Russia claims that
a legal transfer of the territory has taken place, implying that Crimea is no longer a
part of Ukraine, and that the legal status of the maritime zones off the coast of the penin-
sula has changed because of this.
Given that the primary focus of this study is on the maritime parts of the Black Sea
region, I will not attempt to cover all legal aspects of Russia’s 2014 intervention in
Ukraine, which are thoroughly discussed in recent scholarly works such as Grant
(2015) and Sayapin and Tsybulenko (2018). Instead, I would like to offer a few thoughts
on the legality – or lack thereof – of Russia’s exercise of coastal state jurisdiction in the
maritime and shelf areas located off the coast of Crimea, as well as in the Kerch Strait.
This has affected neighbouring states, most notably Ukraine, in a number of ways.
Russia’s attempt to redefine the legal order of the Azov-Black Sea basin has in recent
years become an increasingly prominent aspect of the Russian-Ukrainian (and
Russian-Western) conflict.
Figure 1. The Black Sea region.
Note: Map prepared by the author based on data from, inter alia, the Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory of Columbia
University.
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In order to lay claim to offshore continental shelves or exclusive economic zones (EEZs),
states must be in possession of an adjacent land territory and coastline. In International
Law, it is a well-established principle that “the land dominates the sea”, or in the words
of the International Court of Justice (1969, p. 52), that “[t]he land is the legal source of
the power which a State may exercise over territorial extensions to seaward”. Interstate
conflicts may arise, and occasionally do arise, over both land territories and related mar-
itime entitlements. Such cases are referred to in the literature as “mixed disputes” (Dupont
2018, p. 32, Klein 2019, p. 264). As the cases of Northern Cyprus, Somaliland and Western
Sahara illustrate (Dupont 2018, p. 33), a state’s de facto control over a land area does not
necessarily imply de jure rights in the area’s adjacent maritime zones. If brought before an
international court or tribunal dealing with maritime disputes, the judges’ initial instinct is
often to encourage the claimants to resolve the sovereignty issue first, before it can make
a judgement on the legal status of the maritime zones in dispute.
Russia’s unilateral land grab in February–March 2014, codified in a March 18 treaty
between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Crimea, implied that Russia’s Black
Sea coastline de facto tripled in length from 421 to approximately 1200 kilometres
(Urcosta 2018, p. 29). As for the legal status of the adjacent maritime areas, the
Russian-Crimean “accession treaty” stated that “[t]he delimitation of the maritime
spaces of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov will be implemented on the basis of the
Russian Federation’s international agreements and the norms and principles of Inter-
national Law” (President of Russia 2014). It soon became clear what this meant in practice:
Figure 2. Legal order of the Black Sea region since March 2014, as imposed by Russia.
Note: Map prepared by the author based on data from, inter alia, the Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory of Columbia
University. Similar maps, showing the extent of Russia’s de facto maritime jurisdiction areas in the Black Sea and the
Sea of Azov, have been published in prominent Russian newspapers. See, for instance, Kolesnichenko (2016).
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Russia would acquire and start enforcing coastal state jurisdiction in most of the maritime
spaces southwest, south, southeast and northeast of Crimea, leaving Ukraine with only a
fraction of its former EEZ in the northwestern corner of the Black Sea, as illustrated in
Figure 2. As a result of this move, Ukraine lost control of a maritime area of approximately
100,000 square kilometres (Ustymenko 2020).
West of Crimea, Russia’s illegally claimed EEZ became directly adjacent to the EEZ of
Romania. In this area, Ukraine and Romania had only five years earlier agreed on a mar-
itime boundary, established with the help of the International Court of Justice. In Ukraine’s
view, the 2009 delimitation agreement with Romania is still in force, and Ukraine still
holds a legal claim to this and other parts of its pre-2014 EEZ. This position is also in
line with the assessment made Grant (2015, p. 94):
It would seem that, if Crimea were to be annexed lawfully by a third state, then the Black Sea
maritime boundary would remain as indicated in 2009. This would be consistent with the
principle that boundaries and territorial regimes [at sea] survive a succession of States; the
principle being reflected, for example, in Articles 11 and 12 of the 1978 Vienna Convention
and widely applied in practice. The point as yet has not arisen, the reason being that a
lawful succession of States as yet has not occurred.
East of Crimea, Russia has since March 2014 been in control of both sides of the Kerch
Strait. This has made it easier for Russia to impose restrictions on the commercial ship
traffic between the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov through the Kerch Strait, which is an
important export route for Ukrainian coal, steel and agricultural products. The econ-
omic consequences of this policy will be discussed in greater detail in the next
section. As demonstrated during the “Kerch Strait clash” in November 2018, Russia
has also taken forcible measures to restrict Ukrainian naval vessels’ ability to transit
the strait. Thus, the transit restrictions in this area has clearly also become a security
issue for Ukraine.
It needs to be pointed out that the legal status of the Sea of Azov is different from that
of the Black Sea, where it has long been recognised that UNCLOS regulations apply. At the
time of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Russia and Ukraine had not agreed on a definite
maritime border in the Sea of Azov (Skaridov 2014, p. 222). Two bilateral agreements
signed in 2003 – the “Agreement on Cooperation on the Use of the Sea of Azov and
the Kerch Strait” (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine 2004a) and the “Treaty Between Ukraine
and the Russian Federation on the Ukrainian-Russian State Border” (Verkhovna Rada of
Ukraine 2004b) – left the delimitation question to the future and reconfirmed the previous
understanding that this maritime area was to be regarded as “historically internal waters
of Russia and Ukraine”. Regardless of whether one today considers the Sea of Azov and
the Kerch Strait to be part of a “shared internal waters” regime under customary law,
or subject to UNCLOS, Ukraine undoubtedly enjoys inviolable passage and coastal state
rights in this commercially and strategically important area.6
In an effort to counteract Russia’s “might makes right” approach to the issues men-
tioned above, vindicate its rights as a coastal state and restore the pre-2014 legal order
of the Black Sea, the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait, Ukraine took the step in late
2016 to institute arbitration proceedings against the Russian Federation under Annex
VII of the Law of the Sea Convention. As expected, Russia argued that the arbitral tribunal
of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague had no jurisdiction in the matter
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(Permanent Court of Arbitration 2018). Ukraine, for its part, argued that the tribunal had
“full authority to hear Ukraine’s case”, which was motivated by a desire to put an end to
“Russia’s unlawful exploitation of Ukraine’s sovereign resources” and “Russia’s unlawful
usurpation of Ukraine’s right to regulate its own maritime areas” (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Ukraine 2018b).
Shortly after the “Kerch Strait clash” in November 2018, Ukraine brought a new case
before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), stating that “Russia brea-
ched its obligations to accord foreign naval vessels complete immunity under arts 32, 58,
95 and 96 of UNCLOS and in detaining the 24 crewmembers and initiating criminal
charges against them” (ITLOS 2019a). The Tribunal’s provisional judgement, issued on
25 June 2019, ordered Russia to “immediately release” the detained vessels and
crewmen and return them to Ukraine, and to “refrain from taking any action which
might aggravate or extend the dispute” (ITLOS 2019b). The order was passed by 19
against one vote, the dissenting judge being Roman Kolodkin of Russia, who argued
that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction in the case, which in Russia’s view was a matter of
domestic “law enforcement” (ITLOS 2019c). The detained Ukrainian sailors were returned
to Ukraine as part of a prisoner exchange in September 2019 and the captured vessels
were returned in November 2019. This was an important symbolic victory for Ukraine,
even though Russia continued to infringe on Ukraine’s navigational and coastal state
rights in the region.
The economic dimension
In the seven years that have passed since the annexation, the Crimean peninsula has been
a net drain on the Russian economy, rather than an economic asset. The annual Russian
subsidies to the peninsula have varied between 1 and 2.7 billion dollars (Bershidsky 2019).
In addition comes the Crimean Bridge (3.7 billion dollars) and other costly infrastructure
projects. However, when it comes to the adjacent maritime areas, the picture is more
nuanced, and more favourable to Russia’s long-term economic interests in the region.
Russia’s territorial expansionism and redrawing of maritime boundaries in the Black Sea
region seem to have been motivated not only by Soviet nostalgia, but also by an expec-
tation of economic gains. The sectors of oil and gas, fisheries and maritime trade deserve
special attention in this regard.
Getting access to petroleum deposits on the Ukrainian continental shelf may, as noted
by Maksim Bugriy (2016), have been “an important strategic objective” for the Kremlin. By
annexing Crimea, tripling the length of its Black Sea coastline, expropriating Chornomor-
naftogaz (the Crimean arm of Ukraine’s state-owned oil and gas company Naftogaz) and
pushing Russia’s maritime boundaries well into the Black Sea, Russia has been able to sig-
nificantly increase its economic potential in the region and deal a devastating blow to
Ukraine’s hopes for energy independence (Broad 2014).
Prior to March 2014, Ukrainian authorities and Chornomornaftogaz were manoeuvring
to turn the Black Sea into a viable petroleum-producing region. The country’s long-stand-
ing maritime delimitation dispute with Romania in the eastern part of the Black Sea had
been settled through an ICJ judgement in 2009 (Grant 2015, p. 94), and in 2012–2013,
Ukraine had signed production-sharing agreements (PSAs) with ENI, Shell and Chevron
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to develop gas resources on the Ukrainian continental shelf (Bugriy 2016). In March 2014,
Chronomornafogaz owned 17 hydrocarbon fields, including 11 natural gas fields, 4 gas
condensate fields and 2 oil fields, along with 13 offshore platforms in the Black Sea
and the Sea of Azov (Daly 2014). Two of the company’s most modern drilling rigs in
the region, “Petro Hodovanets” and “Ukraine”, both of which had been purchased from
Singapore in 2012, were in operation at the Odesa gas field, located some 120 kilometres
south of the city of Odesa.
Following the Russia-instigated “referendum” on 16 March 2014 and the signing of the
Crimean-Russian “accession treaty” two days later, most of the assets mentioned above
fell into Russian hands. The treaty had, as noted above, included a brief reference to
the role of “norms and principles of International Law” in the redrawing of maritime
boundaries in the Black and Azov Seas (President of Russia 2014, Article 4, Section 3). It
soon became clear, however, that Russia now considered itself the rightful owner of
the natural resources in the 200-nautical-mile zone outside Crimea, and that the
Russian Coast Guard would start enforcing coastal state jurisdiction in said maritime areas.
The Ukrainian jack-up rigs at the Odesa field, worth close to 800 million dollars, were
seized by Russian special forces on 19 March 2014 and later towed to a location closer the
shore (Bugriy 2016). The rigs were renamed and put into production in a nearby part of
Ukraine’s de facto EEZ, flying Russian flags. The total volume of gas produced at the Odesa
field since March 2014 was in 2019 estimated at 10 billion cubic metres (Klymenko 2019).
The Ukrainians have since 2014 not been able to approach these and other offshore instal-
lations without being intercepted by Russian naval or coast guard vessels.
On the mainland, Chornomornaftogaz and all of its holdings, including offshore fields,
were cut off from Naftogaz of Ukraine, “nationalised” and handed over to Gazprom in
March 2014. Naftogaz has later brought a case before the Permanent Court of Arbitration
in The Hague, seeking compensation for the unlawfully expropriated assets in and around
Crimea, the commercial value of which is estimated at eight billion dollars (Elliott 2020).
Russia and Gazprom have so far rejected all compensation claims put forth by Naftogaz,
and are expected to do so also in the future, even in the case of an unfavourable arbitra-
tion court ruling.
Since the Russian annexation of Crimea, Ukraine has lost access to 80 percent of its
offshore petroleum deposits (Ukrinform 2019) and is currently unable to assert its
coastal state rights in a maritime area three times the size of the Crimean landmass
(Broad 2014). The maritime border between Ukraine and NATO member Romania,
settled in 2009, has now – de facto – become a Russian-Romanian border (Blockmans
2015, p. 183). In significant parts of the Black and Azov Seas, including along the
Donbas coast east of Mariupol, Ukraine has also lost access to living marine resources
that the country was previously able to exploit (Losh 2017). This is due not only to the
Russian annexation of Crimea, but also to the still on-going war in the Donbas.
Ukrainian fishermen in the region are struggling to make a living in the post-2014
environment. Key problems in this regard are the lack of access to fishing grounds and
land-based infrastructure, and frequent inspections, harassment and/or arrests by the
Russian Coast Guard. Russian fishermen, for their part, seem to be expanding their activity
in the Black and Azov Seas. Before the occupation of Crimea, the annual volume of
Russia’s catches in the Azov-Black Sea basin constituted approximately 30,000 tonnes,
as it had been in the preceding six to seven years. In the course of 2014, the Russian
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catches grew to 51,000 tonnes in 2014, and doubled to 102,000 tonnes in 2015, before
flattening out at a level of 103,000 tonnes in 2016 and 90,000 tonnes in 2017 (Mikhnenko
2018). The growing Russian catches and the influx of fishermen from other regions,
including the North Caucasus, have raised concerns about the long-term sustainability
of the Black and Azov Sea fisheries.
When it comes to the issue of maritime trade routes, the consequences of Russia’s
assertive conduct since 2014 are even more dramatic, particularly as relates to the
Kerch Strait and the Sea of Azov. This shallow maritime area, which includes the
narrow passage between Crimea and the Russian mainland, plays an important role in
the maritime economies of both Russia and Ukraine. Significant cargo volumes pass
through the Kerch Strait on their way to and from the Russian Azov Sea ports of Taganrog
and Rostov-on-Don, and the Ukrainian ports of Mariupol and Berdyansk. Mariupol has tra-
ditionally been an important hub for shipments of steel, coal, iron ore, and metallurgical
products. Berdyansk has traditionally handled agricultural cargos, particularly grain. Prior
to 2014, these two ports counted for approximately one quarter of Ukraine’s maritime
exports (Hurska 2019).
In the period between 2014 and 2020, Russia has – in incremental steps – tightened its
grip on the ship traffic that goes through the Kerch Strait, with significant negative con-
sequences for Ukraine’s maritime foreign trade. The first step was Russia’s seizure of
Crimea and “unilateralisation” of the Kerch Strait passage in March 2014 (Pifer 2018).
The second step was the additional security measures that were introduced in connection
with the building of the Crimean Bridge (Kabanenko 2018), which started in 2016. The
third step was the enhanced Russian inspection regime that was implemented in the
spring of 2018 (Klymenko 2019), particularly after the Ukrainian Border Guard’s arrest of
a Russian fishing vessel (“Nord”) in the Azov Sea (Mikhnenko 2018). Thus, the “Kerch
Strait clash” in November 2018 may be seen as a culmination of tensions resulting
from Russia’s increasingly excessive enforcement measures in the period between 2014
and 2018.
On the Ukrainian side, the developments described above have been characterised as
“a slow strangulation” (Shulzhenko and Laurenson 2019) of Ukraine’s Azov Sea ports and
the country’s foreign trade opportunities in the region. According to Ukraine’s Minister of
Infrastructure, Volodymyr Omelian, the economic losses caused by the artificial delays
amount to hundreds of millions of dollars (112UA 2019). The previously busy port of Mar-
iupol has been forced to reduce activity and switch to a four-day workweek, due to falling
cargo volumes (Mikhnenko 2018).
In the spring and summer of 2020, the number of Russian at-sea inspections and the
average length of artificial delays in the Kerch Strait and the Sea of Azov fell to their lowest
levels since June 2018 (Klymenkoet al. 2020). This temporary decline was primarily due to
concerns related to the COVID-19 pandemic and should not be interpreted as an indi-
cation that Russia is prepared to loosen its grip on the commercially and strategically
important waterway.
The security dimension
Compared to the Russian Navy’s other theatres of operation – the Northern, the Baltic, the
Caspian and the Pacific – the Black Sea is the one that has undergone the most profound
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and dramatic changes in recent years. Shortly after the annexation of Crimea in March
2014, Russia established an extensive military presence on the occupied peninsula and
in the adjacent waters, infringing not only on Ukraine’s territorial integrity, but also on
Ukraine’s coastal state rights in the northern part of the Black Sea. As a result of this,
the security situation in the region has deteriorated sharply, and the Black Sea has
become a major source of concern for Western defence planners.
Since 2014, Russia’s military capabilities in the Black Sea region, on land as well as at
sea, have been significantly strengthened. Much like in the economic sector, Moscow
has pursued a policy aimed at ensuring Russian dominance over regional adversaries,
above all Ukraine, and reducing the ability of outside actors, including the U.S. and
NATO, to challenge Russia’s position in the region. Russia’s security policy moves in the
region have been aimed at establishing a multi-layered anti-access/area denial (A2/AD)
zone around the Crimean peninsula, encompassing most of the Black Sea (Gorenburg
2018), and enhancing Russia’s ability to project power into the Eastern Mediterranean
(Kofman 2019). Russia has since 2014 made significant progress in its efforts to take
control of the region’s maritime environment and reshape previously established regional
security arrangements.
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Black Sea coastal states – Bulgaria, Georgia,
Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine – were able to establish regional cooperation
arrangements in the field of maritime security. The joint activities included search and
rescue missions, clearing of sea mines, environmental protection measures and concerted
efforts to address regional security challenges such as smuggling and human trafficking.
The idea of creating a joint naval force was first launched in 1996, and in 2001, the “Black
Sea Naval Co-Operation Task Group” was established at the initiative of Turkey and with
the participation of all of the Black Sea coastal states (Petrovich 2012). Three years later, in
2004, the navies of Black Sea coastal states joined forces in the fight against terrorism and
asymmetric threats in the region, within the framework of operation “Black Sea Harmony”
(Costura and Danila 2009, pp. 35–36). From 2007 on, Russia also regularly participated in
NATO’s “Active Endeavour” operation in the Mediterranean Sea (Lutterbeck and Engel-
brecht 2009, p. 394).
The maritime security cooperation in the Black Sea started to fall apart after the Russo-
Georgian war in August 2008, and even more so after Russia’s occupation and annexation
of Crimea in March 2014 (Gorenburg 2018). In the Black Sea, as in the East Mediterranean,
previous Russian-Western partnerships were replaced by a rapidly growing rivalry (Lutter-
beck and Engelbrecht 2009, p. 394), and an increasingly assertive Russian naval policy.
Russia moved rapidly to consolidate its territorial gains in the region and change the
balance of forces in its own favour. In the autumn of 2019, the Chief of the Russian
General Staff, General Valery Gerasimov, noted that “everything” had changed, and that
Turkey could no longer be considered the “master” (khozyain) of the Black Sea region
(TASS 2019).
Roughly two-thirds of the Ukrainian military units previously stationed in Crimea were
integrated into the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s 22nd Army Corps (Kofman 2019), which was
established in 2016. Ukraine lost most of its navy as a result of the annexation, including
75 percent of its personnel and 70 percent of its ships and shore-based infrastructure
(Chuter 2020). Some of the vessels were able to escape and relocate to Odesa prior to
the annexation, whereas others – mostly small and obsolete ones – were returned by
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Russia afterwards. Some of the Crimea-based Ukrainian aircraft were also returned. But
the country’s military, and especially naval, capabilities were severely degraded.
Simultaneously, Russia started the process of turning Crimea into a “fortress” (Sukhanin
2017). More than 60,000 troops were deployed to the peninsula in the period between
2014 and 2017 (Zerkalo Nedeli 2017). This was five times more than Russia had kept in
Crimea before the annexation. Russia’s naval infantry units were strengthened and mod-
ernised, and new coastal defence units were formed. The Black Sea Fleet’s land com-
ponent received modern attack and transport helicopters, tube and rocket artillery as
well as several batteries of the newest short- to medium-range air defence system,
“Pantsir”. New coastal defence missile systems, such as “Bastion” and “Bal”, have also
been deployed and put in operation, and Russia’s long-range air defence capability on
the peninsula was strengthened through the deployment of “S-300” and “S-400” units
(Kofman 2019). Today, the Russian A2/AD zone extends well into the ocean and airspace
off the coast of Crimea.
It is also worth noting that the offensive capabilities of the Russian Black Sea Fleet have
more than doubled since 2014. The fleet has been replenished with new surface ships and
diesel-electric submarines. The new vessels include Krivak V-class frigates, improved Kilo-
class submarines and Buyan-class corvettes. In the coming years, Russia plans to increase
the total number of such vessels to 18. Almost all of them carry modern anti-ship and
cruise missiles. The Fleet’s new naval strike capabilities include Yakhont and Onyx anti-
ship missiles, with ranges of 250–500 kilometres, and Kalibr cruise missiles, with a
range of up to 2,000 kilometres (Kabanenko 2019, pp. 45–46).
Military developments such as those described above leave little doubt that Russia’s
political and military leaders attach great importance to the need for a strengthening
of the country’s southwestern frontier. General Staff Chief Gerasimov noted in 2016
that “the southwest strategic direction” had become a key priority for the country’s
armed forces (RIA Novosti 2016). Building a defensive perimeter around the Crimean
peninsula, and pushing it towards the Turkish straits and the East Mediterranean,
Russia may not only weaken the position of Ukraine and other Black Sea states. It may
also enhance its freedom and ability to pursue foreign policy objectives in Syria, Libya
and other parts of the Middle East and North Africa.
The Turkish straits are an important transport corridor for the Russian cargo and naval
vessels that go in shuttle traffic between the Black Sea ports of Novorossiysk and Sevas-
topol and the Russian naval facility in Tartus. Russia’s extensive military involvement in the
Syrian civil war since 2015 would not have been possible without the logistical support of
the Black Sea Fleet’s auxiliary vessels and leased cargo ships, often referred to as “the
Syrian express” (Klymenko 2019). The Russian Black Sea Fleet has also provided extensive
fire support for the Syrian mission, launching cruise missiles against land targets from
forward-deployed surface vessels and diesel submarines in the Mediterranean. A signifi-
cant number of cruise missiles (44) have also been launched from Buyan-class corvettes
in the Caspian Sea (Klymenko 2019). The fact that Russia is able to transfer Kalibr-
armed corvettes between the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea, through the Volga and
Don rivers, the Volga-Don Canal and the Sea of Azov, adds to the Russian Navy’s oper-
ational flexibility in the region.
At the same time, Russia is concerned that the strategic arteries between the Mediter-
ranean, the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov may be used as a gateway for Western
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aggression against Russia’s southwestern flank, including the Russian facilities and infra-
structure in Crimea, or terrorist attacks against the Kerch Strait Bridge. Russia’s military
build-up in the region and the restrictive regime enforced by the Russian Coast Guard
in and near the Kerch Strait are often portrayed by Russian authorities as “legitimate
and justified” responses to external security threats (see, for instance, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Russia 2018).
Ideally, Russia would have liked to reduce the presence of NATO warships in the Black
Sea to a level below the limits of the 1936 Montreux Convention, particularly with regard
to the time that non-Black Sea naval vessels may spend there during a deployment – cur-
rently 21 days (Goble 2019). Despite their rapprochement in recent years, Russia and
Turkey have a number of conflicting interests in the Black Sea and the South Caucasus.
During the Nagorno-Karabakh war in the autumn of 2020, they supported opposite
sides, much like they did in the Syrian civil war, and the two countries still compete for
influence in the Black Sea region. They do, however, seem to agree on the need to
keep outside powers’ naval presence in the Black Sea at a low level, and the Montreux
Convention is an important instrument in this regard.
The U.S. and NATO, for their part, do not intend to cede control of the Black Sea to
Russia. Since 2014, the U.S. and NATO have taken various measures to boost the allied
presence in the region and strengthen the security of NATO’s Black Sea member states
and partner nations. A central element in these endeavours is the annual “Sea Breeze”
exercise, which was held for the 20th time in July 2020, hosted by Ukraine (Woody
2020). U.S. and other NATO naval forces, including the Standing Maritime Group Two
(SNMG2), have also routinely conducted patrols and training activity in the region in an
effort to “show the flag” and strengthen interoperability between allies and regional part-
ners. NATO’s presence in the airspace near and above the Black Sea has also been
strengthened, much to the dismay of Russia (Oprihory 2020).
In the coming years, NATO’s southeastern flank may also be strengthened through the
deployment of U.S. ground forces to Romania and/or Bulgaria, as indicated in a June 2020
statement by U.S. Secretary of Defense, Mark T. Esper (U.S. Department of Defense 2020).
The main purpose of such a deployment would be to deter against further Russian expan-
sionism and compensate for the “regional imbalance” caused by Russia’s military build-up
in the Black Sea region (Howard 2020).
Conclusion
Russia’s violent interception and capture of three Ukrainian Navy vessels near the
Kerch Strait in November 2018 may be interpreted as an illustration of the Kremlin’s
desire to assert dominance in the Black Sea region. Perceived in Kyiv as an act of
armed aggression against Ukraine, the incident brought the international community’s
attention to the challenges caused by Russia’s maritime expansionism in the Azov-
Black Sea basin. In violation of international law and bilateral agreements, Russia
has since 2014 pursued an increasingly assertive and revisionist policy aimed at
taking control of the region’s maritime spaces, including significant parts of Ukraine’s
EEZ and continental shelf and the commercially and strategically important transit
routes that go through the Kerch Strait and the Sea of Azov. Ukraine’s ability to exer-
cise its navigational and coastal state rights in the waters south and east of Crimea has
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been seriously hampered by this policy, and the country’s economic losses are
significant.
Since March 2014, Russia has used its de facto control over seven percent of Ukraine’s
land territory (Crimea and the eastern Donbas) as a springboard for regional power pro-
jection into the maritime domain. Through its large-scale military build-up on the Crimean
peninsula and the increased naval and coast guard presence in surrounding waters,
Russia has made significant progress in its efforts to tip the regional balance of power
in its own favour. This has put Russia in a position to unilaterally redraw the maritime
borders of the northern Black Sea and redefine the region’s political and legal orders.
Many of the treaty-based regimes and arrangements that were put in place in the
1990s and 2000s have in recent years been replaced by new ones, dictated and enforced
by Russia.
Most of Ukraine’s EEZ off the coast of Crimea, and numerous installations on the de jure
Ukrainian continental shelf, have been expropriated by Russia. Much like the industrial
facilities on the peninsula itself, many of the expropriated offshore installations were
put into production shortly after the annexation, to the benefit of Russian companies
and the Russian state. Russian fishermen were simultaneously given access to living
marine resources in vast areas previously managed by Ukraine. Russia’s “seize, hold and
exploit” strategy in the northern part of the Black Sea has many similarities with the
policy pursued in the eastern part of the Black Sea in the aftermath of the Russo-Georgian
war in August 2008. Russia still controls 20 percent of Georgia’s land territory, and Geor-
gia’s territorial waters and EEZ off the coast of Abkhazia have long been treated as an inte-
gral part of Russia’s territorial waters and EEZ.
Russia’s efforts to assert dominance in the Black Sea region seem to have been
based on a dual-track strategy aimed at (1) gaining definitive military supremacy
over regional adversaries, including Ukraine, and (2) reducing the ability of outside
actors, such as the U.S., to interfere in regional affairs. Russia has sought to consolidate
its territorial gains in the region through the deployment of land-based military assets,
including long-range air defence systems and other A2/AD capabilities, and increased
patrolling by naval and coast guard forces. Despite its extensive military modernisation
since 2014, Ukraine is not, and will in the foreseeable future not be, in a position to
challenge Russia’s military dominance in the Black Sea region and successfully regain
control of its occupied territories and maritime spaces through the use of military
force.
NATO’s member states in the Black Sea region and their allies and partners, including
Ukraine and Georgia, have in recent years developed and started to implement political
and military strategies to deal with the Russian challenge in the Black Sea region. Though
not explicitly stated, the NATO strategies are increasingly “counter-revisionist” in nature
and comprise elements such as an increased at-sea presence by U.S. and other NATO
naval forces, an enhanced deterrent posture in the region, including on land, and the
expansion of military assistance programs and joint training activities with partner
nations Ukraine and Georgia. Whether and to what extent such measures will have a mod-
erating effect on Russia’s future behaviour in the region remains to be seen. Given the
intensity with which Russia has pursued its revisionist objectives ambitions in the Black
Sea region in recent years, the security challenges on NATO’s southeastern flank are
not likely to go away anytime soon.
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Notes
1. Among the notable exceptions are Schatz and Koval (2019) and Klymenko (2019), which
discuss, respectively, the situation in the Kerch Strait/Sea of Azov and the Black Sea.
2. In Russian military terminology (see, for instance, RIA Novosti 2016), the “Southwest Strategic
Direction” refers to the Black Sea region and adjacent land and maritime areas, such as the
North Caucasus and the Eastern Mediterranean. The other “strategic directions” are the
Western, the Northern, the (Far) Eastern and the Southern.
3. It may be argued that regional security systems, such as that of the Black Sea region, may
function as “miniature anarchies – in their own right” (Buzan 2016 [1991], p. 173). This is
not to say that the power dynamics at the regional level are analogous to those at the
global level. As pointed out by Lake and Morgan (1997, p. 9), global and regional systems
differ in the sense that the former are to be seen as “closed” systems, whereas the latter
are inherently “open”. Regional systems may be heavily penetrated by one or more extra-
regional powers, if the extra-regional powers have the willingness and capability to bring
their influence to bear at the regional level.
4. Defensive realists see states as “security maximisers”, whereas offensive realists see them as
“power maximisers”.
5. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) was established in 1992 and achieved “organis-
ation” status in 1999.
6. For a detailed discussion, see Skaridov (2014) and Schatz and Koval (2019).
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